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Abstract 
This paper argues for a return to the social thought of the often ignored early 20th Century 
English thinker G.D.H. Cole. Cole combined a sociological critique of capitalism and liberal 
democracy with a well developed alternative in his work on Guild Socialism bearing particular 
relevance to advanced capitalist societies. Both of these, with their focus on the limitations 
on ‘free communal service’ in associations and the inability of capitalism to yield 
emancipation in either production or consumption, are relevant to social theorists looking to 
understand, critique and contribute to the subversion of neoliberalism.  Therefore, we 
suggest that Cole’s associational sociology, and the invitation it provides to think of 
formations beyond capitalism and liberal democracy, is a timely and valuable resource which 
should be returned to. 
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Introduction 
In 2010, Routledge published new editions of some of G.D.H. Cole’s works. While a highly 
welcomed decision, little room was made for the distinctively sociological works of Cole, such 
as Social Theory (1920) and Essays in Social Theory (1950). This did not come as a surprise, for 
Cole was, and continues to be known, for his political ideas and activism. A close inspection 
of his works, including the most ostensibly political ones such as Guild Socialism Restated 
(1980), nevertheless reveals an acute interest in sociological theorising. His rejection of what 
he viewed as an ‘isolation of specialized studies from the general study of Society as a whole’ 
(Cole, 1950: 29) in early 20th century British sociology1 meant that he consistently sought to 
articulate sociological concerns with those of a political nature. Thus, although a sociological 
perspective is clearly discernible in his work, it assumes a distinctive form, combining both a 
critical and normative outlook. 
Imbued with the task of stimulating large-scale social change and shaping its direction, 
Cole’s works were underpinned by the typically modernist concern for the development of 
emancipatory practices, particularly discernible during his Guild Socialist phase.2 In this article 
we demonstrate what this has to offer social theory today by exposing both the 
distinctiveness of his perspective and its relevance to contemporary conditions.  There have 
been attempts to revive Cole for contemporary discussion, most prominently in the work of 
Hirst on associative democracy (Hirst 1994).  Hirst returned to Cole’s ideas – which we will 
discuss below – of free association and functional representation (despite the criticisms he 
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offers of Cole’s conception of this, Hirst 1994:45) as central to a new social and political order.  
While Hirst’s work, along with that of other writers we will discuss below, has been admirable 
in its attempt to demonstrate Cole’s relevance to the current day, these share two factors 
which we aim to move away from in this article.  Firstly, in such arguments, Cole is presented 
primarily as a political theorist, with his associational view seen as political ‘pluralism’.  
Secondly, in doing so, some commentators such as Stears (2006) have seen Cole’s pluralism 
as innately socialist, while others have downplayed the connection of Cole’s normative 
pluralism to his critique of capitalism (See for example Hirst 1994:19).  Contrary to such 
accounts, we shall present Cole as a sociologist who spoke about the value of a normatively-
driven sociological approach and decried those who had adopted a Weberian value-free 
perspective (Cole 1957c).  
We shall begin by drawing the broad contours of what we term his ‘associational 
sociology’.  This will include highlighting the importance of a sociological reading of Rousseau 
on Cole’s thought and how he distances himself from Durkheim.  It will then be shown how 
his sociological stance informed his own critique of capitalism and liberal democracy.  Here 
we note similarities and differences between Cole’s critique and that of Marxism, as well as 
his value as potential critic of neoliberalism. This will be followed by a discussion of his 
sociological alternative, marked by a focus on the potential for associative action and its 
political representation.  We will also discuss some of the key tendencies towards social 
change Cole identified, and their relevance to present-day conditions. 
 
Drawing the contours of Cole’s associational sociology 
Cole was a prominent figure in the short-lived Guild Socialist movement of the early twentieth 
century. The movement located associative life at the centre of its socialist vision, treating it 
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as the principal precondition for emancipatory practices. For Cole, associative action is not so 
much a utopian vision to force onto social life as an essential component of any pre-existing 
social organisation. This is explained by the fact that ‘almost every individual in [society] has 
[...] close contacts with many diverse forms of social institution and association’ (Cole, 1920: 
4). As trade unionists, members of a sports team or political party, at the workplace or in their 
leisure time, individuals often share a ‘common purpose or purposes’ and ‘rules of common 
action’ which are essential components of associative action (Cole, 1920: 37). This led Cole to 
treat the ‘action of men in association’ as ‘the subject matter of social theory’ (Cole, 1920: 
17). Associative action itself, then, presupposes all forms of social organisation and, 
correspondingly, acts as an essential medium for the development of societal norms and 
value structures.  
For Cole, then, associative action is a social fact and sociology’s most fundamental unit 
of analysis. But how does he explain individuals’ willingness to enter into association with 
others and adopt cooperative forms of action? Two dimensions can be found in Cole’s 
explanation. The first one focuses on the rational component of associative action, where 
‘[t]he consciousness of a want requiring co-operative action for its satisfaction is the basis of 
association’ (Cole, 1920: 34). The ‘want’ in question can assume a multitude of forms, ranging 
from the production of a material requirement, fulfilling our consumer needs, or the pursuit 
of non-economic interests. These are satisfied through the spheres of production, 
consumption and civic activity (Cole 1920) respectively. The second element is a deeper, 
affective, dimension where individuals engaging in cooperative action are ‘led to do so by a 
strong impulsion of the sentiment of social solidarity’ (Cole, 1950: 128). The existence of a 
multitude of social organisations and the possibility for social order are therefore explained 
by the fact that individuals are cooperative beings by nature. 
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Despite such a prominent emphasis on associative/cooperative action, his sociological 
perspective is first and foremost one concerned with the problem of human emancipation. 
Along with Laski and Tawney, Cole developed a ‘new brand of individualism’ (Stears, 2006: 
102), that sought to remedy the apparent problems associated with the overly communal 
nature of freedom found in Figgisian pluralist thought (Stears, 2006). His works emphasised 
individuals’ continuous desire to maximise their ‘personal liberty’ (Cole, 1920: 184). 
Understood as a form of pleasurable self-expression achieved by the release of the ‘creative, 
scientific and artistic impulses’ (Cole 1980, 115-6), his approach to emancipation echoes 
Marx’s call for the ‘open revelation of human faculties’ in his Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts (2000: 102).3 It also exhibits features of the reconciliation of sensuous and 
rational faculties advocated by first generation Frankfurt School theorists (Masquelier, 2014).  
He was nevertheless critical of the scientific component of the ‘Marxian method’ 
(Cole, 1948: 14) for its tendency to dissolve the ‘constructive influence of the minds of men’ 
(Cole, 1948: 34) as well as for the corresponding ‘error to attribute to “classes” [...] any reality 
distinct from that of the individuals which compose them’ (Cole, 1948: 11). Insisting that ‘men 
make their history,’ he hoped to formulate a sociological perspective in which individuals’ 
own capacity to both control and alter their conditions of existence is fully recognised. To do 
so, he thought, one had to re-assess the respective place held by the general (class 
structures/consciousness) and the particular (individual agents’) conceptions of the good life. 
The reality of the former had to be re-aligned with that of the latter.  
 In order to better grasp how Cole attempted to solve the riddle of this relationship, 
exemplified by the antagonism between liberals and communitarians (Eisenberg, 1995),4 one 
has to turn to the inspiration he drew from Rousseau, particularly his concept of general will.  
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In doing so, we can see that Cole turned to Rousseau for sociological inspiration rather than 
treating him as a strictly political figure. Indeed, while he admired Rousseau for treating the 
will to cooperate as derivative of an innate impulse towards sociality, Cole also praised his 
views on the effects of associative action on the relationship between individual and 
collective conceptions of the good life. He interpreted such a relationship as follows: 
 
whenever [individuals] form or connect themselves with any form of association for 
any active purpose, [they] develop in relation to the association an attitude which 
looks to the general benefit of the association rather than their own individual benefit. 
This is not to say that they cease to think of their own individual advantage – only that 
there is, in their associative actions, an element, which may be stronger or weaker, of 
seeking the advantage of the whole association, or of all its members, as distinct from 
the element which seeks only personal advantage. (Cole, 1950: 114) 
 
Here associative action resurfaces not merely as the product of a will but also as the 
source of social organisation whose object ‘is not merely material efficiency, but also 
essentially the fullest self-expression of all the members’ (Cole, 1920: 208). The purpose of 
the association itself is therefore construed by Rousseau (and Cole) as an extension of 
individuals’ own interests/will. Consequently, the ‘personal freedom’ (Cole, 1917: 5) 
associations succeed in facilitating becomes both constitutive of and constituted by the 
common good embodied in the general will of each association. The freedom arrived at here, 
therefore, does not consist of an unlimited, unhindered or absolute right to act as one 
pleases, such as Rousseau’s ‘natural freedom’ (Simpson, 2006). Instead, it takes the shape of 
a form of moral autonomy entailing 'obedience to the law which we prescribe to ourselves’ 
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(Rousseau, 1993: 196). Cole nevertheless insists that despite its ‘rational precepts,’ this moral 
freedom ‘finds an echo in the heart of the ‘natural man,”’ with ‘”human feeling” as its 
motivating force’ (Cole, 1993: liii-liv).  Therefore, moral freedom and its realisation in the 
associative will is a building block of sociality. 
Alongside such a concern for the maximisation of personal freedom in associations, 
one finds what Stears characterised as Cole’s ‘obsession with complex and competing social 
allegiances’ (2006: 99). Their very existence, he thought, meant that in order to remain truly 
free, individuals could not owe allegiance to a single authority, but would instead develop 
different categories of ‘loyalties’ and ‘obligations’ (Cole 1926).  These are determined by the 
type of association – producer, consumer or civic – to which individuals belong. Since they 
develop through associative action, however, these loyalties and obligations are not obstacles 
to autonomy. Instead, they are both a desirable and necessary component of associative life 
giving ‘men [sic and throughout this article] the fullest possible scope for creative activity’ 
(Cole, 1950: 97). It is their capacity to accommodate the principle of ‘self-government’ (Cole, 
1917) and, as Warren recently put it, yield a ‘power to make collective decisions’ through 
‘equal participation in collective judgment’ (2001: 60) that associations can, in principle, be 
expected to pave for the way for agency (see Lamb, 2005).  It is through our associational 
activity that, both historically and in day-to-day actions, agency is achieved, alongside the 
personal/creative development of the individual.5 
Cole identified one last essential feature of the form of associative life organised 
around the principle of ‘self-government.’ Having observed the development of a ‘spirit of 
free communal service’ (Cole, 1980: 44) in the medieval guilds, Cole envisaged a similar 
development in associations. To be able to yield such a ‘spirit,’ he argued, the individual ‘must 
feel that he is enjoying real self-government and freedom at his work; or he will not work well 
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and under the impulse of the communal spirit’ (Cole, 1980: 49). This can be achieved where 
associations substitute the ‘motives of greed and fear’ (Cole 1980: 45) with the ‘motive of 
free service’ and ‘breed men capable of being good citizens both in industry and in every 
aspect of social life’ (Cole, 1980: 61). Consequently, associations must free themselves from 
any distortion capable of undermining the fine balance between individual conceptions of the 
good life and the common good.6 
 To summarise, associative action is central to Cole’s sociology, as it constitutes an 
innate impulse towards sociality, it is thought to be beneficial, if not essential, for human 
emancipation and the development of a solidaristic outlook.  In doing so, Cole shares 
similarities with Durkheim not only in associative action’s role in the development of 
solidarism, but also in the means (guilds/corporations) to achieve this.  Indeed, Cole spoke 
positively of Durkheim’s work as an indication of the kind of social science combining analysis 
of the political and economic, which he favoured (Cole 1934: 3).  A full exposition of these 
links is beyond this paper (see Dawson 2013: 62-83). However, there are some differences.  
Most notably, Cole emphasised what he saw as the ‘conservative’ nature of Durkheim’s 
theory and its lack of materialism. For Cole, it was capitalism which gave society its value 
structures and Durkheim marginalises this in seeing religion as the base of society (Cole 
1952:127).  This is why Cole formulated his associational sociology alongside a stringent 
critique of the capitalist economic and socio-political institutions based on the very 
sociological premises detailed above. It is to this critique and a demonstration of its relevance 
to contemporary conditions that we shall now turn.  
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From associational sociology to a critique of capitalism and liberal democracy 
Cole’s associational sociology informed the core postulates of his critique of capitalism and 
liberal democracy. As an economic system favouring profit over need; competition over 
cooperation; efficiency and productivity over ‘pleasure in work well done’ (Cole, 1980: 61); 
and ‘greed [...] and fear’ over ‘free and communal service’ (Cole, 1980: 44-5), it failed to give 
scope to ‘man’s natural qualities’ (Cole, 1917: 256). Consequently, 
 
[t]he crowning indictment of capitalism is that it destroys freedom and individuality in 
the worker, that it reduces man to a machine, and that it treats human beings as 
means to production instead of subordinating production to the well-being of the 
producer. (Cole, 1917: 24) 
 
Not only was ‘the primitive social impulse [...] overlaid by bad institutions’ (Cole, 1950: 
129), the latter also destroyed personal freedom while causing the ‘failure of the association 
so affected to fulfil its proper function in Society’ (Cole, 1950: 145). Despite not having lived 
long enough to be able to witness capitalism’s latest evolutions, a close reading of his work 
reveals a contemporary relevance to societies under the rule of neoliberal economic and 
political forces, some of which will be discussed in this section. 
 A first key dimension of his critique relates to the sphere of production. Drawing his 
inspiration from William Morris, Cole wrote extensively on the problems emanating from an 
‘impulse towards self-expression thwarted by commercialism’ (Cole, 1980: 119). Like Morris, 
and unlike Durkheim, Cole was a fervent critic of the division of labour, with a particular 
concern for its tendency to ‘divorce the executant from the designer or planner’ and the 
resulting loss of the ‘dignity of common labour’ (Cole, 1957a: 9). Like the early Marx, he 
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treated production as a central outlet for self-expression and cooperative action.7 
Correspondingly, he equated the increased specialisation of tasks engendered by the 
subordination of workers to a productivist regime of capital accumulation with a loss of 
control fatal to production’s essential role in the release of ‘creative, scientific and artistic 
impulses.’ Cole, here, would have also been at home with critics of Fordist scientific 
management on production, such as Braverman (1974).  
Since the 1970s, however, innovative methods of production have emerged that are 
often said to have marked the emergence of a ‘post-Fordist’ regime of accumulation aimed 
at overcoming the rigidities of its predecessor (Harvey, 1989; Kumar, 1995). Despite post-
Fordism’s relative success in  achieving a degree of ‘elimination of job demarcation’ (Harvey, 
1989: 177), managerial horizontalism (Kasmir, 1996) and a generally ‘enhanced work 
satisfaction for the bulk of workers’ (Kumar, 1995: 47), contemporary commentators have 
highlighted its limited capacity to yield authentic and lasting self-expression. This state of 
affairs, it is argued, derives from production processes subjected to highly flexible, globalised 
and competitive labour markets and privatised resources geared towards the 
‘accommodation of ceaseless change’ (Piore and Sabel, 1984: 17). Often, then, the central 
resultant of the rule of these neoliberal economic forces is described as an intolerable 
economic insecurity causing the erosion of loyalties and obligations; or, as Sennett (1998) put 
it, ‘the corrosion of character’. 
The objective character of such insecurity has been disputed by Doogan whose 
empirical analysis revealed that ‘job stability has not declined and that long-term employment 
has increased in many sectors of the advanced economies’ (Doogan, 2009: 4). It follows that 
in order to find an explanation for the sense of insecurity dominating neoliberal societies, one 
has to move away from the widespread view that the material impact of neoliberalism 
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encourages insecurity, towards a diagnosis more inclined to accept the notion of distortion of 
the associative will proposed by Cole. Doogan offers a convincing Bourdieusian 
reconceptualisation of insecurity by treating it as an ideological tool employed for ‘both 
political ends and political advantage’ (Doogan, 2009: 10). But, Cole’s work makes its own 
contribution to the diagnosis by concentrating on the effects of ‘bad institutions’ – most 
notably capitalist markets and corporations – on individuals and, more specifically, their 
capacity to achieve associative self-expression. For, with Cole’s critique of capitalist 
institutions, the neoliberal ‘rhetoric’ of self-reliance and self-responsibility deconstructed 
(and condemned) by Bourdieu and Wacquant (2001: 4), comes to be treated as a barrier to 
both the rational and sentimental motive of associative action. Under its spell, individuals 
cope with the sense of insecurity through an intensified competitive pursuit of self-interest 
or ‘rugged individualism’ preventing any inclination towards the communal spirit experienced 
as a desirable or natural end. The resulting disconnection between individual interests and 
the common good means any form of freedom granted by neoliberal market forces becomes 
meaningless. This is explained by the fact that it divorces the longing for secure self-
expression or control, from the form of associative action that could give them the 
‘confidence without which freedom can hardly be exercised’ (Bauman, 2005, 36). Therefore, 
adapting elements of Cole’s critique of capitalism to a critique of marketization processes 
unfolding under the rule of neoliberalism, makes it possible to gain a fresh insight into the 
‘normative fragmentation of [neoliberal] societies’ (Crouch, 2011: 180). 
Moreover, Cole’s critique did not, as did most Marxian critiques of his time, limit itself 
to problems associated with production. Conscious of the fact that the individual worker did 
‘not find his job interesting or pleasurable and seeks his pleasure outside it, in his hours of 
leisure’ (Cole, 1957b: 16), he expressed an early interest in exploring matters regarding 
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consumption. Cole quickly came to realise that consumption was subjected to very similar 
repressive forces to those found in production. Like producers, he argued, consumers lacked 
the capacity to exert sufficient control over the decisions taken within their own sphere of 
activity. By ‘dictat[ing] the consumer what he shall consume’ and ‘exploit[ing] the community 
as the individual profiteer exploits it to-day’ (Cole, 1917: 108), commercial agencies deny 
individuals the ‘freedom for the creative impulse’ as well as for ‘the impulse of free and 
unfettered service’ (Cole, 1917: 302). While neoliberal regimes have made markets more 
responsive to consumer demands, thereby recognising that ‘wants are of the most diverse 
character’ (Cole, 1920: 33), this development has also been accompanied by a further 
atomisation of society. Any potential for collective ‘control of consumption’ (Cole 1917: 281) 
is lessened under such a regime. Once again, then, Cole’s own condemnation of the distortion 
of a potential sphere of self-expression and associative action by divisive economic forces 
appears to bear striking relevance to present conditions. In fact, like Bauman, Cole viewed 
the solitary search for pleasure in consumption as an insufficient condition for an effective 
and sustained gratification – or what Bauman (2000) would call ‘de facto individualisation’ – 
dependent on forms of collective control heavily distorted by untrammelled market forces.8 
Therefore, while Cole shared the emphasis on consumption as a realm of identity found in 
contemporary sociology, he combined this with a materialist critique of its atomised form. 
Cole also took the care of explaining what he thought were the causal origins of such 
distortive tendencies:  
 
In our own Society at least, and in the larger industrialised communities generally, 
economic divisions are at the present time the principal obstacles to the fulfilment of 
social functions. (Cole, 1920:  151) 
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Therefore, in common with Marxian ideas of the conflict between labour and capital, 
Cole wished to emphasise the highly distorting effects of such a conflict on the experience of 
associative action. Under a clearly identifiable relationship between ownership and control, 
such as the one found under the early capitalist stage, the conflict of interest between the 
capitalist owner and wage labourer visibly lies at the root of the some of the major obstacles 
to cooperation and self-expression. Once wage labourers come to include ‘technical 
specialists, managers, financial experts, buyers and agents whose status and remuneration 
were a long way above those of the manual workers and of workshop foremen and 
supervisors’ (Cole, 1938: 102), one witnesses a ‘blurring of class-divisions’ (Cole, 1938: 128) 
posing new challenges for collective action. While, as Cole observed, such a state of affairs, 
partly driven by the spread of ‘financial capitalism’ (Cole, 1938), did not prevent the ‘growing 
concentration of control of capital’ (Cole, 1938: 126) it did divide the working-class movement 
(Cole, 1948: 155). The historical significance of a new and ‘greatly differentiated’ proletariat 
comprising many ‘grades of labour and levels of incomes and education’ (Cole, 1948: 171), 
such as the one found in the neoliberal age, was therefore anticipated by Cole in the 
immediate post-war era. 
Thus far we have highlighted the following critiques from Cole: the lack of self-
expression in work; the distorting of ‘free and unfettered service’ in associations; lack of 
control in consumption, the origins of economic distortion and the fragmented nature of class 
inequality.  However, additional effects of these inequalities can also be identified beyond the 
economic sphere, making Cole’s critique also one of the political. Cole viewed the modern 
state as ‘an organ of class domination’ both ‘perverted by the power of the capitalists’ and 
‘based on coercion’ (Cole, 1980: 122). Here he argued that the liberal democratic conception 
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of the state as a ‘self-subsistent and individual realit[y] similar to, or greater than, the persons 
who are members of [it]’ (1920: 22), not only acts as a barrier to the political representation 
of the plurality of interests making up social life, but also embodies a ‘conception of human 
society in terms of Force and Law’ (Cole, 1920: 6). Consequently, liberal democracy is said to 
rely on a conception of the common good which it has to manufacture in the face of 
‘contending sections’ (Cole, 1920: 150) found in a highly hostile capitalist economy. As the 
effective product of competing interests, then, the capitalist state ultimately fails to recognise 
‘the motives which hold men together in association’ (Cole, 1920: 6); it fails to recognise the 
associative wills.  
Cole was therefore conscious of, and indeed highly concerned by, the tendency of 
socio-economic inequalities to undermine the democratic character of political decision-
making. His critique of liberal democratic institutions is therefore first and foremost a critique 
of capitalism. The ‘predominance of economic factors’ (Cole, 1980: 180) found in societies 
whose (economic and political) institutions are oriented towards capital accumulation, 
effectively distorts decision-making processes.   The result of this is the reproduction, at the 
political level, of the conflictual relations found in the economy, coming to undermine the 
forms of collective control necessary for truly democratic action. Cole, then, ‘treated the 
influence of economic factors upon non-economic forms of association as a form of 
perversion’ (Cole, 1920: 145). However, since Cole wrote most of his works during the liberal 
stage of capitalist development comprising a state seeking to minimise its role in economic 
affairs, he did not live long enough to witness the emergence of the neoliberal state. This 
‘distinctive form of [the neoliberal] state’ (Jessop, 2002: 95) is, contrary to its liberal 
counterpart, clearly ‘proactive in promoting the competitiveness’ of its economic space ‘in 
the face of intensified international [...] competition’ (Jessop, 2002: 124). Today one finds 
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political forces playing a central role in eliminating barriers to the free accumulation of capital, 
e.g. labour rights, and promoting  ‘economic and extra-economic conditions’ (Jessop, 2002: 
95) leading to ‘huge transfer of public funds to private power’ (Chomsky, 1999: 67-8). If one 
adapts Cole’s logic of reasoning to the present situation, one no longer merely finds the state, 
as social organisation, falling victim to economic ‘perversion,’ but rather sees this institution 
as one of its key culprits, reflecting contemporary arguments concerning the statist nature of 
the supposedly anti-statist neoliberal project (Harvey 2005). In fact, in Cole’s work, one finds 
a range of sociological considerations with which to better appreciate the full scope of the 
perverse effects of neoliberal forces on society, by complementing the Marxian critique of 
the state’s role in promoting the interests of capital with a critique of its role in distorting 
associative life.  
Furthermore, Cole consistently deplored the fact that the political system had 
developed into a ‘single omnicompetent representative assembly’ (Cole, 1920: 108) 
attempting to manage a ‘vast society which changed its basic structure so fast that the 
magnitude and growing complication of its problems outran hopelessly their capacity to learn 
the difficult art of collective control’ (Cole, 1950: 91). The key issue at hand here is the 
incapacity of the state to promote ‘active [...] citizenship’ (Cole, 1920: 113). On the one hand, 
Cole takes issue with the form of representation entailed by liberal democratic decision-
making processes, which continue to predominate in contemporary Western political 
systems. Their inadequacies, he argues, is explained by the fact that ‘as soon as the voters 
have exercised their votes, their existence as a group lapses until the time when a new 
election is required’ (Cole, 1920: 110). Since ‘no man’s will can be treated as a substitute for, 
or representative of, the wills of others’ (Cole, 1920: 103), liberal democracy is based on a 
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‘false theory of representation’ (Cole, 1920: 103). In short, it excludes the forms of associative 
action necessary for truly active political participation.  
Although Cole lived long enough to witness the gradual expansion of the state’s 
administrative apparatus following the political and economic crises of the 1920s and 1930s, 
he had already expressed concerns regarding the effects of bureaucratisation on personal 
freedom prior to this period. For Cole, the key problem with such a ‘machinery’ was not its 
size but its very nature (Cole and Mellor, 1918: 36). In addition to the problems of 
representation mentioned above, bureaucracy manages all affairs from the ‘point of view of 
“efficiency”’ and at the expense of ‘full and complete’ freedom (Cole and Mellor, 1918: 25). 
By subsuming individuals’ variegated interests under the universal yardstick of economic 
efficiency, it is thought to bear restrictive effects on individuals’ actions. Bureaucracy, then, 
is yet another political institution restricting the freedom of individuals and an additional 
instance of the perversion of the political sphere by economic interests under capitalism. 
Initially, then, it seems that Cole would have welcomed the neoliberal critique of the 
bureaucratic state. However, upon closer examination, what Cole’s critique of political 
institutions under capitalism – including his critique of bureaucracy – seems to offer is a basis 
upon which to grasp such measures as yet another, and indeed more total, instance of 
economic perversion. Adopting Cole’s own reasoning, then, individuals could be said to end 
up more directly and completely exposed to volatile economic forces ultimately responsible 
for increased economic insecurity, sharper socio-economic inequalities and de-solidarisation 
under the neoliberal regime. Consequently, had Cole lived long enough, he would have surely 
condemned the role played by an increased exposure to market forces and their evidently 
pernicious effects on the ‘motives which hold men together in association.’ 
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In his critique of liberal capitalism, then, Cole grappled with the obstacles to human 
emancipation by condemning the perverse and distorting effects of ‘bad institutions’ on self-
expression and associative action. Under the guise of neoliberal capitalism, one finds a 
historically specific configuration of economic and political forces further undermining the 
capacity for collective control and authentic self-expression. Flexible labour and consumer 
markets, sharp socio-economic inequalities and the ‘competitive Schumpeterian state’ 
(Jessop, 2002) all affect social relations in a particular way. More specifically, they lead to a 
divorce of the pursuit of self-expression from the ‘primitive social impulse,’ further subject 
individuals to the divisive rule of market forces and impose additional barriers to political 
representation of social plurality.  Here we see his critique was not simply a realisation of a 
pluralist political position, as suggested by others (Hirst 1994), but rather one founded on a 
Rousseau-ian sociological base.  
Despite such obstacles to human emancipation, however, the present situation offers 
new opportunities for radical social change. The next section shall therefore aim to expose 
them, while highlighting the relevance of his libertarian socialist alternative to neoliberalism.  
 
Bringing associative action to life 
In the first chapter of Guild Socialism Restated, Cole described the task of the guild socialist, 
i.e. his own task, as follows:  
 
He [the guild socialist] claims, not to be imagining a Utopia in the clouds, but to be 
giving form and direction to certain quite definite tendencies which are now at work 
in Society, and to be anticipating the most natural developments of already existing 
institutions and social forces. (Cole, 1980: 11)  
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 Some of these ‘definite tendencies’ were highlighted above and demonstrate the 
grounded, sociological, nature of his critique and alternative. There, it was shown that Cole 
treats associative action as a necessary – and therefore pre-existing – condition for all forms 
of social organisation including present ones, and places it at the core of his sociological 
approach. Under the spell of capitalist economic interests, associative action does not vanish, 
it merely becomes subsumed under the ethos of competitive individualism, economic 
efficiency and a coercive political machine. Cole’s task consequently consists in creating 
conditions under which the associative spirit or will can thrive and become the central force 
mediating social relations, i.e. to substitute ‘bad’ institutions with ‘good’ ones.  
Cole’s remedy to the ills of capitalism assumes the form of a libertarian socialist 
alternative which aims to re-organise society in such a way as to ‘afford the greatest possible 
opportunity for individual and collective self-expression to all its members’ (Cole, 1980: 13). 
Voluntary, open, inclusive and democratic associations are here the chosen form of social 
organisation, for in them individuals are thought to be in the best position to ‘agree[...] 
together upon certain methods of procedure, and lay[...] down, in however rudimentary a 
form, rules for common action’ (Cole, 1920: 37). The democratic and generally cooperative 
character of practices flourishing within such associations are treated by Cole as ideal 
conditions for the development of a ‘communal spirit’ (Cole, 1980: 46) and the elimination of 
the various ‘hindrances’ to self-expression such as inequality, bureaucratic managerialism and 
the division of labour. Thus, in virtue of their capacity to give full scope to horizontal decision-
making processes, democratic associations play a central part in Cole’s attempt to ‘offer the 
means to resolve the familiar tensions between political power and individual development’ 
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(Eisenberg, 1995: 5).9  This, in fact, partly explains its appeal to political theorists as a third 
way when shorn of its anti-capitalist elements. 
Various additional conditions for emancipation were laid down by Cole. Firstly, he 
believed that the realisation of such conditions was predicated upon ‘self-government on the 
smallest natural units of control’ (Cole, 1980: 101). The close interpersonal proximity these 
‘small units’ tend to confer would facilitate the development of values of ‘cheerfulness, 
comradeliness, co-operativeness, consideration, kindness’ (Cole, 1950: 7). By ‘natural’ Cole 
meant ‘[m]en’s easiest ways of grouping’ and, as such, refer to units such as ‘the places they 
live in and the places they work in’ (Cole, 1950: 107). Both the size and locality of associations 
are therefore treated as important factors by Cole, for these conditions are instrumental in 
shaping the spirit of fellowship and facilitating the representation of the plurality of interests 
making up social life.  In a complex and differentiated neoliberal world, whereby ‘differences 
pile up one upon the other’ (Bauman, 1997: 13), Cole’s associations would not only provide 
means for the institutional recognition of plurality, but would also serve to alleviate the 
‘overwhelming sensation of insecurity’ (Bauman, 1997: 204) accompanying it. For Cole, this 
re-organisation of social life could only be achieved through a re-organisation of economic 
life. 
To the ‘industrial autocracy of capitalism’ (Cole, 1980: 51), Cole opposed ‘a free 
[economic] system [that] will bring to the front man’s natural qualities – his sense of 
fellowship, his desire to express himself’ (Cole, 1917: 256). Such a ‘free system,’ would alter 
the experience of producers in such a way as to ‘make the enterprise he works in a success, 
not in terms of profit, but in terms of rendering a good service to the consuming public, and 
thus contributing towards the improvement of the general standard of living’ (Cole, 1957b: 
36). Democratic associations of producers, the modern guilds, would not only secure the 
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collective forms of control required for authentic self-expression, but would also substitute 
the ‘motives of greed [...] and fear’ with ‘the spirit of free and communal service.’ Such a spirit 
is, today, partly exemplified by the production of Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) 
programmes providing a free service while relying on a form of ‘voluntaristic cooperation that 
does not depend on exclusive proprietary control or command relations’ (Benkler 2013:214), 
such as Mozilla Firefox or Wikipedia.  
Now in a position to make collective decisions regarding the pace of the labour process 
and the nature of the tasks involved in making the products, members of democratically 
organised associations can begin to expect working conditions giving them ample scope for 
creative and, following Cole’s reasoning, pleasurable practices.  The emergence of joint-stock 
companies as a ‘sign of the growing ‘democratisation’ of the capitalist system’ (Cole, 1948: 
123) could initially be said to have marked a further democratisation of the economy. 
Nevertheless, the limited power accorded to voters and the growing concentration of capital 
found in such a system (Piketty, 2014) means such bodies are associative ‘only in form’ (Cole, 
1948: 103), thereby demonstrating the limit of capitalism’s capacity to align individuals’ 
interests with the common good.  This indicates the need for structural change in both 
production and market conditions, which Cole recognised and proposed to undertake 
through a re-organisation of the relationship between production and consumption: 
 
A man is usually either a miner or a railway-man, and not both; but he consumes coal, 
uses the railways, and only limits the variety of his consumption by his lack of 
opportunity. But in both the essential social differentiation is not that between 
individuals but that between interests or concerns, that is, between types of 
production and consumption. (Cole, 1980: 81) 
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Implicit in this passage is Cole’s rejection of some elements of liberal thinking. What 
he partly wishes to convey here is the fact that the pursuit of freedom through self-expression 
does not lead to a separation or differentiation between individuals. A key failure of 
(neo)liberalism is to overlook the fact that the very process involved in such a pursuit entails, 
and is indeed most successfully accomplished through, the collaboration with other 
individuals sharing similar interests. In societies subjected to the logic of the capitalist market, 
the competitive pursuit of freedom by the producer often confronts that of the consumer as 
an obstacle to the latter. Here one not only finds a differentiation/separation between the 
producer and consumer but, more crucially, an antagonism between these parties, which 
assumes a particularly acute form in societies more completely exposed to the vicissitudes of 
market forces. Cole’s proposal to rethink the relationship between them is, given the 
aforementioned contemporary focus on consumerism as a realm of self-actualisation, timely. 
He did so by pointing out a crucial feature of the process of satisfaction of needs, namely the 
fact that, by definition, the interests of producers and consumers are necessarily in a state of 
mutual dependence. Without the production of a good, the consumer is unable to use it. 
Without the consumption of a good, the raison d’être of a product and a producer’s work 
vanishes. For this reason, he concluded that  
 
the whole body of consumers and the whole body of producers are practically the 
same people, only ranged in the two cases in different formations. There can be no 
real divergence of interests between them. (Cole, 1980: 38-9) 
 
22 
 
 By rethinking the relationship between producer and consumer, Cole offers a platform 
upon which to re-evaluate the place held by associative action in the process of satisfaction 
of needs. One finds that the conditions for collective control are not confined to actions 
between different producers or consumers, but are equally attainable (and indeed desirable) 
in relations between these two spheres. It is from this stance that Cole came to design his 
own alternative to the capitalist market, which we shall call here the ‘dialogical coordination 
of needs satisfaction’. 
 As we have seen, for Cole, actually existing emancipation rests on individuals’ capacity 
to achieve collective control.  Therefore, he construed his task as one primarily oriented 
towards the elimination of all hindrances to such control both within and between the 
spheres of production and consumption. Within the productive sphere a key indicator of such 
a change could be found in cooperatives, whereby the implementation of ‘one member, one 
vote’ (Cole 1948: 127) provided a basis for collective control. Their potential role in serving  
large-scale social change has in fact recently been emphasised by several contemporary 
commentators (Alperovitz, 2011; Wyatt, 2011; Wolff, 2012; Shantz and Macdonald, 2013), 
thereby making them more likely agents of change than those Cole (1980) had in mind, 
namely the trade unions. Cole was nevertheless conscious of the need for cooperatives 
currently to submit to the demands of the capitalist market.  Their potential for emancipation 
was necessitated on the need for public ownership and a non-capitalist market based upon 
the dialogical coordination of needs satisfaction. In an associative body such as the 
cooperative, the spirit of free and unfettered service would be secured by giving workers the 
means to control the labour process, and consumers the means to define their needs 
collectively. However, the prospects for the generalised release of this spirit rest on producers 
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and consumers fully ‘negotiat[ing] on equal terms’ (Cole, 1917: 86).  Another level of 
cooperation, this time between producers and consumers, is therefore required.  
Here dialogical coordination comes to play a key role in virtue of making ‘the fullest 
provision for joint consultation and action between the Guilds and the consumers’ 
organisations at every stage, local, regional and national’ (Cole, 1980: 90-1). With it, the 
‘invisible hand’ of the capitalist market dictating the allocation of resources and limiting the 
effective control of producers and consumers alike vanishes, to pave the way for a consistent 
dialogue between representatives of associations in each of the two dimensions 
(supply/production and demand/consumption) of the process of satisfaction of needs. While 
the flexibility of post-Fordism equipped production with a stronger capacity to meet the 
plurality of wants and introduced ‘cooperation’ as a ‘key managerial strategy and a dominant 
corporate ideology of flexible accumulation’ (Kasmir, 1996: 30), it did so at the expense of 
economic security and consumer association as opposed to atomisation. What Cole’s 
dialogical coordination offers is a third way which aims to achieve a combination of autonomy 
and security. As such, he provides means for the institutionalisation of the ‘collective 
protection’ of freedom, which Bauman himself has repeatedly urged to realise in societies 
subjected to the fragmentary rule of privatisation and flexibilisation (1997: 205). The freedom 
to choose and release of the various ‘creative, scientific and artistic impulses’ through 
production and consumption would here, Cole believed, be given the means to become a 
meaningful and collective endeavour. It would oppose the rather ‘corrosive’ (Sennett, 1998) 
effects of flexible labour markets and individualistic search of pleasure characterising 
contemporary capitalist societies, which implicitly rely on collective notions of ‘good’ 
consumption found in reference groups (Bauman, 1997) with fully emancipatory practices. In 
order to meet its objectives, however, the aforementioned second level of cooperation must 
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develop a system of representation capable of giving the fullest scope to both consumers’ 
and producers’ wills/interests in dialogue. 
 It is here that Cole makes a second distinctive contribution, but this time as the 
alternative to (neo)liberal democratic (‘false’) representation. His critique of liberal 
democracy led him to rethink the relationship between the economy and politics in such a 
way as to overcome the perversion of the latter by the former alongside its lack of functional 
representation. This, he argued, can only be achieved once the distance between the 
representative and the represented is minimised, and channels of communication between 
the local, regional and national levels are fully developed. This is done in two ways. Firstly, 
Cole insisted on the availability of a ‘right of recall’ by the represented party on the 
representative (Cole, 1980: 134). Secondly, the ‘true’ representation of the general will of a 
local association – itself an extension of an individual’s will – can only be expected under 
conditions whereby the purpose of the association, i.e. its function, is itself being 
represented. Only then could political representation give recognition to the social value of 
an association’s function and become a real source of social empowerment, for the 
’functional organisation of Society contains in itself the guarantee of the recognition of the 
fact that society is based upon the individuals’  (Cole, 1920: 192). Representing the function 
of an organisation at the political level therefore entails a direct representation of an 
individual’s will. As ‘the underlying principle of social organisation’ (Cole, 1920: 48), then, 
function ought to become the underlying principle of political representation if the latter is 
to be expected to give scope to personal freedom. The state as we know it would here vanish 
to pave the way for producer guilds and consumer councils functionally represented and 
coordinated by a ‘commune’ at the local, regional and national levels (Cole, 1980: 124).   
25 
 
 Given the increasingly complex and globalised nature of the contemporary world, 
however, one is justified in asking how Cole sought to address the problem of international 
relations. Such a theme was picked up by Holthaus, who convincingly demonstrated how 
Cole’s own ‘functionalism,’ particularly the one found in his work following the Guild Socialist 
phase, could make it possible to envisage ‘democratic empowerment and transnational co-
operation’ (2014: 15). Here, Cole’s functionalism is said to have combined ‘some economic 
democracy and consent about long-term economic aims’ (Holthaus, 2014: 12) in an 
institutional vision oriented towards the international coordination of the process of 
satisfaction of needs.10  
The global significance of Cole’s thought can also be found in some contemporary 
global formations, most notably the alter-globalization – at least in its ‘way of subjectivity’ 
form (Pleyers 2011) – and Occupy Wall Street movements.  These developed ways of 
organising which, in their use of groupings such as ‘general assemblies’ and ‘working groups’ 
in order to achieve ‘horizontal’ organisation around ‘consensus’ (Flank, 2011: 8), reflected the 
‘functional bodies’ organised in a commune as advocated by Cole (cf. Cole, 1980: 124).  The 
sociological value of Cole’s perspective lies in the link it draws between the pluralisation of 
everyday life, that we engage in multiple forms of production, consumption and civic activity, 
and the multiple points of entry, including the functionally specific points, which he advocates 
for the political sphere.  The diversification of movements, found in the way of subjectivity, 
reflects these conditions and the shift to what Boltanski terms the ‘artistic critique’ which 
‘becomes exasperated with all which standardises, uniformises and massifies’ (Boltanski 
2002:6).  Like Cole, then, members of contemporary social movements seek to accommodate 
the pluralist reality of complex and differentiated societies in highly consensual decision-
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making processes aimed at unleashing the free communal spirit through seemingly functional 
forms of representation11.     
 
 
Conclusion 
Keen to circumvent the aporias of mere negation and unwilling to find comfort in the belief 
in capitalism’s self-destruction, Cole unreservedly and unashamedly construed his task as 
sociologist in distinctively prescriptive terms. His work not only reveals a high degree of 
optimism regarding individuals’ capacity to become ‘socially good,’ but also proposes possible 
avenues for the attainment of such a goal. To the perversion of an innate impulse towards 
sociality by capitalist and liberal democratic institutions, he opposed a form of social 
empowerment thought to facilitate the undistorted release of such an impulse.  
Like the Burawoyan (2005) public sociologist, Cole would want us to take a moral 
stance; to publicly condemn what one views as intolerable conditions of existence; to engage 
with and serve the public so as to maximise the progressive impact of sociological research. 
But Cole’s ambition for sociology (and social sciences as a whole) also reached beyond the 
confines of contemporary public sociology. He did not merely seek to induce social change by 
stimulating indignation, but complemented the latter by an ambitious programme of action 
which could today serve as an invaluable source for the task of counteracting divisive 
neoliberal forces and reinvigorating associative life like a phoenix rising from the ashes of 
economic perversion.  
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1 See Dawson and Masquelier (2015) for more detail on Cole’s relation to sociology in Britain 
2 Such a phase, characterised by a ‘politics of democratic persuasion and individual freedom’ (Stears, 2006: 274) 
is often distinguished from later concerns regarding socialist strategy and tactics and the acceptance of a positive 
role for the state and planning in international affairs, in response to the political and economic crises of the 
1920s and 1930s (Holthaus, 2014), for Wright (1979) Cole moves from guild socialism to ‘liberal socialism’ in an 
attempt to defend the British order against fascism.  Although he is said to have eventually returned to his initial 
libertarian concerns (Stears, 2006), Cole never really abandoned the view that ‘Socialists [...] do not regard the 
increase in State control over economic affairs [...] as marking any advance towards a Socialist system’ (Cole, 
1938: 204) and in his final book argued ‘I feel sure that a Socialist society…must rest on the widest possible 
diffusion of power and responsibility, so as to enlist the active participation for as many as possible of its citizens 
in the tasks of democratic self-government’ (Cole 1960: 337).  Therefore, while throughout the rest of the article 
we will refer to Cole’s guild socialist ‘phase’, by this we mean the period (mainly from 1917-1925) in which Cole 
was an active member of the guild socialist movement and used its terms, without also saying that this was a 
normatively distinct phase of Cole’s oeuvre.  
3 Cole’s work, however, shows no evidence that he had read this particular text, which may have been translated 
in English too late for Cole to get a chance to engage with it. 
4 Communitarianism should here be understood as a political-philosophical stance giving a central place to the 
values of a group, often at the expense of individual conceptions of the good life. 
5 Although Eisenberg highlighted Cole’s incapacity to achieve such a goal by failing to ‘understand the need for 
diversity’ and personal development (1995: 74), it seems that Cole was more conscious of such issues than she 
allows him to be. For example, in Essays in Social Theory, Cole emphasises the need to recognise the ‘continuous 
adaptation to changing needs and growing knowledge’ (Cole, 1950: 74). Such an oversight could be explained 
by the fact that Eisenberg drew her claims from only one of Cole’s work, namely Social Theory (1920)   
6 Like Habermas, Cole sought to protect interpersonal relations against the distorting effects of money and 
power. However, Rousseau’s influence on Cole’s wish to turn ‘sentiment’ into ‘a force in the shaping of human 
affairs’ (Cole 1950, 128), led him propose a different relationship between ‘reason ordering and will acting’ from 
the one found in Habermas’s work (Habermas 1989, 82). Indeed, while the latter effectively dissolved ‘will acting’ 
in ‘reason ordering’ within his theory of communicative action (See Masquelier 2014), Cole attributed a central 
role to actions driven by the ‘will’ of individuals. 
7 As Stears (2006) and Holthaus (2014) noted, Cole did nevertheless express doubts regarding the treatment of 
production as a potential sphere of pleasurable self-expression following the demise of the Guild Socialist  
movement and the economic crisis.  
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8 For a more detailed discussion of the affinity between Cole and Bauman, see Dawson (2013). 
9 Although Eisenberg makes this claim with regards to the potential of political pluralism in general – not Cole’s 
own – it was shown above that Cole does succeed in combining both elements.   
10 Holthaus (2014) did nevertheless reveal that Cole’s international thought fell short of developing a vision 
capable of fully excluding the state from the management of international affairs.  
11 For a more detailed analysis of the similarities between Cole’s own alternative and contemporary social 
movements see Dawson (2013) and Masquelier (2014) 
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